Do you know about - International Law And The Right To A healthy Environment As A Jus Cogens Human Right
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To date, traditional international law does not think human environmental rights to a clean and healthy environment to be a jus cogens human right. Jus cogens ("compelling law") refers to preemptory legal theory and norms that are binding on all international States, regardless of their consent. They are non-derogable in the sense that States cannot make a reservation to a treaty or make domestic or international laws that are in friction with any international bargain that they have ratified and thus to which they are a party. They "prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in friction with them... [and are] field to modification only by a subsequent norm... Having the same character." (1) Thus, they are the axiomatic and universally standard legal norms that bind all nations under jus gentium (law of nations). For example, some U.N. Charter provisions and conventions against slavery or torture are considered jus cogens rules of international law that are nonderogable by parties to any international convention.
While the international legal theory has evolved to embrace and even codify basic, non-derogable human rights (2), the evolution of environmental legal regimes have not developed as far. While the previous have found a place at the highest level of universally recognized legal rights, the latter have only recently and over much opposition, reached a modest level of recognition as a legally regulated activity within the economics and politics of sustainable development.
1. The international legal society recognizes the same sources of international law as does the United States' legal system. The three sources of international law are stated and defined in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (R3dFrlus), Section 102. The first source is traditional International Law (Cil), defined as the "general and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation" (3) (opinio juris sive necessitatus), rather than out of moral obligation. Furthermore, Cil is violated whenever a State, "as a matter of state policy,... Practices, encourages or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery... (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment... Or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." (4) To what extent such human rights need to be "internationally recognized" is not clear, but indubitably a majority of the world's nations must identify such rights before a "consistent pattern of gross violations" results in a violation of Cil. Cil is analogous to "course of dealing" or "usage of trade" in the domestic industrial legal system.
Evidence of Cil includes "constitutional, legislative, and administrative promulgations of states, proclamations, judicial decisions, arbitral awards, writings of specialists on international law, international agreements, and resolutions and recommendations of international conferences and organizations." (5) It follows that such evidence is enough to make "internationally recognized human rights" protected under universally recognized international law. Thus, Cil can be created by the normal proliferation of the legal acknowledgment (opinio juris) and actions of States of what exactly constitutes "internationally recognized human rights."
2. The next level of binding international law is that of international agreements (treaties), or accepted International Law. Just as jus cogens rights and rules of law, as well as Cil, are traditional and universally binding legal precepts, so do international treaties form binding international law for the Party Members that have ratified that treaty. The same way that some States' domestic constitutional law declares the basic human rights of each State's citizens, so do international treaties generate binding law about the rights delineated therein, according to the traditional international jus gentium principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements are to be respected). Treaties are in turn internalized by the domestic legal theory as a matter of law. Thus, for example, the U.N Charter's provision against the use of force is binding international law on all States and it, in turn, is binding law in the United States, for example, and on its citizens. (6) Treaties are analogous to "contracts" in the domestic legal system.
Evidence of accepted International Law includes treaties, of course, as well as linked material, interpreted under the usual canons of construction of relying on the text itself and the words' ordinary meanings. (7) Often, accepted law has to be interpreted within the context of Cil. (8) As a practical matter, treaties are often modified by amendments, protocols and (usually technical) annexes. Mechanisms exist for "circumventing correct application of consent" by the party states. Generally, these mechanisms comprise "framework or umbrella conventions that merely state normal obligations and fabricate the machinery for further norm-formulating devices... Private protocols establishing single substantive obligations... [and] technical annexes." (9) Most of these new instruments "do no need ratification but enter into force in some simplified way." (10) For example, they may need only signatures, or they enter into force for all traditional parties when a minimum amount of States ratify the modification or unless a minimum amount of States object within a certain time frame, or goes into force for all except those that object. (11) Depending on the treaty itself, once basic consensus is reached, it is not requisite for all to consent to certain modifications for them to go into effect. "[I]n a sense these are instances of an Igo [(international governmental organization)] organ 'legislating' directly for [S]tates." (12)
3. Finally, rules of international law are also derived from universal normal theory of Law "common to the major legal systems of the world." (13) These "general theory of law" are theory of law as such, not of international law per se. While many think these normal theory to be a secondary source of international law that "may be invoked as further rules... Where appropriate" (14), some think them on an "footing of formal equality with the two positivist elements of practice and treaty". (15) Examples are the theory of res judicata, equity, justice, and estoppel. Frequently, these rules are inferred by "analogy to domestic law about rules of procedure, evidence and jurisdiction." (16) However, "while shared concepts of of internal law can be used as a fall-back, there are sever limits because of the characteristic differences in the middle of international law and internal law." (17) Evidence of normal theory of Law includes "municipal laws, religious doctrine and judicial decisions." (18)
Treaty provisions and their inherent obligations can generate binding Cil if they are "of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a normal rule of law." (19) A basic installation of this article is that the "relatively exclusive ways (of lawmaking) of the past are not favorable for modern circumstances." (20) Jonathan Charney maintains that today's Cil is more and more being created by consensual multilateral forums, as opposed to State practice and opinio juris, and that "[consensus, defined as the lack of expressed objections to the rule by any participant, may often be sufficient... In theory, one clearly phrased and strongly endorsed notification at a near-universal diplomatic forum could be enough to fabricate new international law." (21) This process should be fine conceptually as "general international law", rather than Cil, as the International Court of Justice (Icj) has often done.
In like vein, Professor Gunther Handl argues that all multilateral environmental agreements (Meas) of "global applicability" generate "general international law":
"A multilateral treaty that addresses basal concerns of the international society at large, and that as such is strongly supported by the vast majority of states, by international organizations and other transnational actors,-- and this is, of course, indubitably the case with the biodiversity, climate, and ozone regimes, among others-may indubitably generate expectations of normal compliance, in short such a treaty may come to be seen as reflecting legal standards of normal applicability... And as such must be deemed capable of creating rights and obligations both for third states and third organizations." (22)
Notwithstanding, Daniel Bodansky argues that Cil is so rarely supported by State action, that it is not traditional law at all. "International environmental norms reflect not how states usually behave, but how states speak to each other." (23) Calling such law "declarative law" that is part of a "myth system" representing the public ideals and the "verbal practice" of States, he concludes that "our time and efforts would be better spent attempting to translate the normal norms of international environmental relations into concrete treaties and actions." (24)
However, a spin of the current status of international human rights and environmental law may spin the mechanisms for raising environmental rights to the level of jus cogens rights. For example, the U.N. practice on the Law of the Seas (Unclos), whose negotiation was initiated in 1972 and signed in 1982, was considered by most countries to be Cil by the time it came into force in 1994. (25)
Ii. Current Status Of The Right To A healthy Environment No State today will publicly state that it is within its sovereign rights to damage their domestic environment, much less that of the international community, however most States do not guarantee environmental safety as a basic human right. Currently, environmental law is composed of mostly accepted International Law and some Cil. The previous relies on express consent and the latter on implied consent, unless a State avails itself of the Persistent Objector principle, which precludes it from being bound by even most Cil. Unlike for human rights and international crimes, there is no normal environmental rights court in existence today. While the Law of the Sea Tribunal and other U.N. Forums (e.g., the Icj) exist for trying cases of treaty violations, non-treaty definite violations have no international venue at present. Italian consummate Court Justice Amedeo Postiglione states that
"[T]he human right to the environment, must have, at the international level, a definite organ of safety for a basal legal and political reason: the environment is not a right of States but of individuals and cannot be effectively protected by the International Court of Justice in the Hague because the predominantly economic interests of the States and existing institutions are often at loggerheads with the human right to the environment." (26)
Domestic remedies would have to be pursued first, of course, but standing would be granted to Ngos, individuals, and States when such remedies proved futile or "the dispute raises issues of international importance." (27) For example, although the Icj has an "environmental chamber" and U.S. Courts often appoint "special masters" to deal with these types of disputes, it is clear that the recognition of the human right to the environment needs an international court of its own in order to identify such a right and remedy international violations in an efficient and equitable manner. (28)
Iii. The Jus Cogens Nature Of Environmental rights Irrespective of definite treaty obligations and domestic environmental legislation, do States, or the international society as a whole, have a duty to take measures to forestall and safeguard against environmental hazards?
Human rights are "claims of entitlement" that arise "as of right" (31) and are independent of external justification; they are "self evident" and basal to any human being living a dignified, healthy and efficient and rewarding life. As Louis Henkin points out:
"Human rights are not some abstract, inchoate 'good'; they are defined, single claims listed in international instruments such as the [U.N.'s] Universal notification of Human rights and the major covenants and conventions. They are those benefits deemed requisite for Private well-being [sic], dignity, and fulfillment, and that reflect a common sense of justice, fairness, and decency. [No longer are human rights regarded as grounded in or justified by utilitarianism,] natural law,... public contract, or any other political theory...[but] are derived from standard principles, or are required by standard ends-societal ends such as peace and justice; Private ends such as human dignity, happiness, fulfillment. [Like the basal rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, these rights are] inalienable and imprescriptible; they cannot be transferred, forfeited, or waived; they cannot be lost by having been usurped, or by one's failure to practice or enounce them." (32)
Henkin distinguishes in the middle of "immunity claims" (such as 'the State cannot do X to me'; the hallmark of the U.S. Constitutional jurisprudential system) and "resource claims" (such as 'I have a right to Y') such that the Private has the right to, for example, free speech, "food, housing, and other basic human needs." (33) In today's "global village", the Right to a healthy Environment is clearly a "resource claim" and a basic human need that transcends national boundaries.
According to R.G. Ramcharan, there is "a correct duty... To take efficient measures" by States and the international society as a whole to safe the environment from the inherent hazards of economic development. (34) His position is that the Human Right to Life is a. Jus cogens, non-derogable peremptory norm that by its very nature includes the right to a clean environment. This duty is clearly spelled out in such multilateral treaties as the Un practice on Desertification, the Un Framework practice on atmosphere Change, and the practice on Biological Diversity. (35) It is expounded in the Stockholm, Rio and Copenhagen Declarations as a core component of the principle of Sustainable Development. It forms the basis of Nafta's, the Wto's and the European Union's economic development agreements, and the European practice and the International ageement on Civil and Political rights (Iccpr), which has been ratified by most countries in the world, including the United States.
The Human Right to a healthy Environment is explicitly contained in the Inter-American and African Charters, as well as in the constitution of over 50 countries worldwide. Whether it is based on treaties, Cil, or "basic principles", the obligation of the international society to the environment is today clearly spelled out and enforceable through international tribunals. For example, the Lhaka Honhat Amid Curiae Brief recognized the rights of the indigenous peoples of Argentina to "an environment that supports bodily and spiritual well being and development." (36) Similarly, in a detach decision, the Inter-American Human rights Commission upheld the right of the Yanomani in Brazil to a healthy and clean environment. (37) On a global level, the Un Human rights Committee has indicated that environmental damage is "a violation of the right to life contained in article 6(1) of the [Iccpr]". (38)
Thus, today, the erga omnes obligation of States to take efficient steps to safeguard the environment is a duty that no State can shirk or ignore. If it does, it runs the risk of prosecution by international courts and having to fabricate measures commensurate with its responsibility to safe its share of the "global commons". Interestingly, the plan of jus cogens emerged after World War Ii as a response to the commonly held view that the sovereignty of States excused them from violating any of the then so-called Cils. according to Black's Law Dictionary, "there is a close association in the middle of jus cogens and the recognition of a 'public order of the international community'... Without expressly using the plan of jus cogens, the [Icj] implied its existence when it referred to obligations erga omnes in its judgment... In the Barcelona Traction Case." (39)
Iv. Third Generation Human rights And The Environment Is environmental safety is an erga omnes obligation, that is, one owed to the international society as a whole as a jus cogens human right?
In a detach plan to the Case about the Gebecikovo-Nagymaros task (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judge Weeramantry, the Vice President of the Icj, expounded on the legal basis for sustainable development as a normal principle of international law. In the process, he concludes that environmental safety is a universal erga omnes legal norm that is both Cil as well as a normal principle of law per se. In Gebecikovo, ostensibly to have been decided upon the merits of the treaty governing the construction of power plants along the Danube, as well as by international traditional law, the Icj held that the right to development must be balanced with the right to environmental safety by the principle of sustainable development. Even in the absence of a definite treaty provision, the plan of sustainable development has become a legal principle that is "an integral principle of modem international law". (40)
Sustainable development is also recognized in State practice, such as the Dublin notification by the European Council on the Environmental Imperative. (41) As such, sustainable development has in consequent been raised to the level of Cil.
For example, the Martens Clause of the 1899 Hague practice Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land has been interpreted in 1996 by Judge Shahabudeen of the Icj as providing a legal basis for inferring that normal theory rise above practice and treaty, having their basis in "principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience". (42) according to Weeramantry, "when a duty such as the duty to safe the environment is so well standard that all citizens act upon it, that duty is part of the legal theory in question... As normal theory of law recognized by civilized of nations." (43)
Sustainable development acts as a reconciling principle in the middle of economic development and environmental protection. Just as economic development is an inalienable right of States' self-determination, environmental safety is an erga omnes obligation of all States for the benefit of the global commons that all share. "The principle of sustainable development is thus a part of modern international law by fancy not only of its certain logical necessity, but also by fancy of its wide and normal acceptance by the global community", and not just by developing countries. (44)
Drawing upon the rich history of diverse cultures' legal systems and what he calls "living law", Judge Weeramantry points out that traditional respect for nature has been a guiding moral and legal principle for economic development throughout history. The Icj has also recognized these theory in such previous decisions as Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) in 1972. (45) Judge Weeramantry concludes that the "ingrained values of any civilization are the source from which its legal concepts derive... [and that environmental safety is] among those pristine and universal values which command international recognition." (46)
The first generation of Human rights were those declared by the "soft law" of the Universal notification of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to life freedom and safety of person." Art. 3. It was modeled on the U.S. Bill of rights and the American notification of Independence. This was echoed in the binding Iccpr ("Every human being has the inherent right to life.", Iccpr, Art. 6(1) (1966)), which the U.S. Has ratified, and the American practice on Political and Civil rights of the Inter-American theory (which draws direct connections in the middle of human rights and environmental rights).
The second generation of human rights emerged with the Economic, public and Cultural (Ecosoc) rights developed in such treaties as the International ageement on Economic, public and Cultural rights (Icescr; which the U.S. Has not ratified), and many foreign State's Constitutions (e.g., Germany, Mexico, and Costa Rica). These comprise the right to free option of work, to (usually free) education, to rest, leisure, etc. Highly complied with in Europe, these rights have additionally been extensive by the Eu in their European public Charter (1961) creating much legislation for the safety of workers, women, and children.
The third and current generation of human rights has emerged from the Eco-Peace-Feminist Movement. These comprise the Right to Development, the Right to A Safe Environment and the Right to Peace. In essence, this third generation of rights addresses the question of poverty as a public (and hence legally redressable) ill that lies at the core of environmental problems and violations. The "environmental justice" movement considers cases that demonstrate that environmental pollution is disproportionately prevalent in minority communities, Whether at a local or international level. Authors John Cronin & Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., have explicitly entitled their study of environmental pollution along the Hudson River The Riverkeepers: Two Activists Fight to Reclaim Our Environment as a Basic Human Right. (47) This predominantly U.S. Movement focuses on "environmental racism" as a means for seeking remedies or the disproportionate pollution of minority communities as violations of current civil rights legislation by "exploring] the use of the nations' environmental laws to safe the rights of the poor." (48)
V. Recognition, Commitment And obligation Of A Right: The Montreal Protocol As A Model For Consensus construction The key mechanisms for establishing binding international law are recognition of an obligation or right, commitment to its protection, and efficient obligation methods. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is the "most foremost precedent in international law for the administration of global environmental harms." (49) It serves as a model for many other environmental concerns that need decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty, global non-consensus, and high harm-avoidance costs. It was the first international "precautionary" treaty to address a global environmental concern when not even "measurable evidence of environmental damage existed." (50) Although ozone depletion by chloro-fluorocarbons (Cfcs) and other ozone depleting substances (Odss), and the attendant harms of overexposure to harmful ultraviolet radiation, had been suspected by scientists in the early 1970s, it was not until 1985 and the Vienna practice for the safety of the Ozone Layer that international activity was taken to address the problem.
The Vienna practice For The safety Of The Ozone Layer At the time of the Vienna Convention, the U.S. Represented over 50% of the global consumption of Cfcs in a billion shop for aerosol propellants alone. Overall, Cfc products represented a billion shop and about a quarter of a million jobs in America alone. (51) The Clean Air Amendments of 1977 and the 1978 Epa ban on all "non-essential" uses of Cfc in aerosol propellants was swiftly followed internationally by similar bans by Sweden, Canada and Norway. (52) These actions were a direct response to consumer pressure and shop demands by newly environmentally-conscious consumers.(53) Incentives were also provided to the developing countries so that they could "ramp up" at uncostly levels of reductions. (54)
Creative ratification incentives included requiring only 11 of the top two-thirds of Cfc producing countries to ratify and bring the treaty into force. (55) As a consequent of such flexibility, innovation, consensus and cooperation, the Montreal Protocol has been hailed as a major success in international diplomacy and international environmental law. Today roughly every nation in the world is a member (over 175 States).
The London Adjustments And Amendments Of 1990 By 1990 scientific confirmation of global warming and the depletion of the ozone layer led to the London Adjustments and Amendments. Again, U.S. Associates such as Dupont, Ibm and Motorola reacted to huge negative media attention and promised to halt faultless output by 2000.
Non-compliance procedures were made even more user friendly and no sanction for non-compliance was initiated against a country that was failing to reach quotas while acting in good faith. Technology change was made in a "fair and favorable way", with developed countries taking the lead in assisting developing countries reach compliance. (56) The U.S. Instituted "ozone depletion taxes" which did much to get more total compliance, as well as promoting investigate into Cfc alternatives. (57) To emphasize the vast obligation mechanisms employed, think that by early 1998 the U.S. Justice agency had prosecuted 62 individuals and 7 corporations for the illegal smuggling into the emergent Cfc black markets. Despite an international crackdown by the Fbi, Epa, Cia, and Interpol in the global police attempt performance Breeze, 5 to 10 thousand tons are smuggled annually into Miami alone, second only to cocaine smuggling. (58) In 1992 the Copenhagen Amendments required every State party (practically the whole world) to fabricate "procedures and institutional mechanisms" to conclude non-compliance and enforcement. (59)
Vi. Conclusion: requisite infirmity Of The Current theory And The Legal Consequences Of The Right To A healthy Environment As A Basic Human Right
The requisite weaknesses of the existing theory comprise self-serving pronouncements by non-complying States, lack of efficient obligation mechanisms, political limitations such as State sovereignty and the "margin of appreciation", and the lack of universal consensus on basic human rights terminology and their enforcement. As long as States can ignore ordinary violations of human rights (sporadic instances of torture, occasional "disappearances") and shun the edicts of human rights judicial decisions, there can be no efficient theory of international human rights enforcement. Currently, unless a State commits such outrageous acts on a mass scale that affects world peace, such as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it can often evade its responsibilities under international human rights treaties.
There are few international agreements that admit of universal jurisdiction for their violation by any State in the world. All Cil, however, is by its very nature prosecutable under universal jurisdiction. "Crimes against humanity" (e.g., War Crimes, genocide, and State-supported torture) are universally held to be under universal jurisdiction, typically in the International Court of Justice, ad hoc war crime tribunals, and the new International Criminal Court.
While interpretive gaps exist, it is not inconceivable that the right to a healthy environment can be extrapolated from current international environmental treaties and Cil. At the treaty level, the safety of the environment appears to be of famous importance to the international community. At the level of Cil, there is much evidence that the right to a healthy environment is already an internationally protected right, at least as far as trans-boundary pollution is concerned. In any case, it seems to be universally held that it should be protected as a right. The impression is that there is an unmistakable consensus in this regard. "Soft law" over time becomes Cil.
The U.N. World Commission on Environment and development released the Earth Charter in 1987. It has yet to be fully implemented on a global scale. Its broad themes comprise respect and care for the environment, ecological integrity, public and economic justice and democracy, nonviolence and peace. (60) The seminar can be made that by now, safety of the environment has reached the threshold of traditional International Law. Whether the nations of the world choose to thereafter identify the right to a healthy environment as a jus cogens human right will depend on the near universal consensus and political will of most of the nations of the world. Until then, as long as human life continues to be destroyed by "human rights ratifying" nations, how much obligation will be employed against violators of environmental laws when the right to a healthy environment is not upheld as a basic human right remains to be seen. It will take the cooperation of all nations to ensure that this becomes a non-derogable, unalienable right and recognizing it as requisite to the Right to Life.
1. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 102 cmt. K (1987).
The elements can also be found in the Vienna Convention, article 53.
2. For example, the Right to Life, to be Free from Torture, Genocide, and Murder.
3. R(3d)Frlus § 102(l)(a) and cmt. H.
4. Id., § 702 (my emphasis).
5. Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 6 (3d. Ed, Aspen Law & enterprise 1999).
6. R3dFrlus § 102(2).
7. Janis, supra.
8. David Hunter, et al., International Environmental Law and Policy, p. 306 (2d. Ed., Foundation Press 2002).
9. Paul Szasz, International Norm Making, in Edith Brown Weiss, Ed., Environmental turn In International Law (1995), as quoted in Id, p. 307.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. R3dFrlus § 102(l)(c), as presented in Donoho, supra.
14. Supra, R3dFrlus §102(4).
15. Shabtai Rosenne, practice and Methods of International Law 69 (1984), as quoted in Hunter, Id, p. 317.
16. Hunter, supra, p. 316 (Foundation Press 2002).
17. Id, p. 316.
18. Janis, supra, p. 29.
19. Id, p. 312.
20. Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 Am.J.Int'l.L. 529, at 543-48 (1993), as quoted in Hunter, supra, p. 322.
21. Id.
22. Gunther Handl, The Legal Mandate of Multilateral development Banks as Agents for turn Toward Sustainable Development, 92 Am.J.Int'l.L. 642, at 660-62 (1998), as quoted in Hunter, supra, p. 324.
23. Daniel Bodansky, traditional (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 105, 110-119 (1995), as quoted in Hunter, Id.
24. Id.
25. Id, p. 659.
26. Amedeo Postiglione, The Global Environmental Crisis: The Need for and International Court of the Environment, Icef International article at 33-36 (1996), quoted in Hunter, supra, p. 495.
27. Id., p. 496.
28. Id.
29. Id, p. 1298.
30. Id, p. 1299.
31. L. Henkin, "The Human rights Idea", The Age of rights (reprinted in Henkin, et al., Human Rights, 1999), as presented in Donoho, supra, p. 14-16.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The Right to Life, p. 310 (The Hague, 1983), quoted in Hunter, supra, p. 1297.
35. Hunter, supra, p. 341.
36. Id, p. 1299.
37. Id, p. 1294.
38. Id, p. 1295.
39. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 864. (West 1999).
40. Hunter, supra, p. 339-341.
41. Id, footnotes 1 through 6, pp. 341-342.
42. Id, pp. 317-318.
43. Id, p. 345.
44. Id, p. 342.
45. Id, p. 315.
46. Id, p. 344.
47. In particular, see pages 35, 38, 159, 162, 177-199 and 221 (Scribner 1997).
48. New York Law Journal, January 1993, Friday, Environmental Law, p. 3. See also, Discussion: Reflections On Environmental Justice, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 357, 2001.
49. Hunter, supra, p. 526.
50. Id, p. 527, quoting Richard Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy 2 (1998)
51. Id, p. 532.
52. Id, p. 535.
53. Id, p. 542.
54. Id, p. 545.
55. Id.
56. Id, p. 550-54.
57. Id, p. 562.
58. Id, p. 559.
59. Id, p. 566-67.
60. Roland Huber, International Environmental Law Seminar: Human rights and the Environment, p. 24, in Donoho, Douglas L., International Human rights (printed by the Shepard Brad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, 2002).
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